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TRUSTS
Gerald LeVan*
ESTATE PLANNING AND SUCCESSION OF HYDE
In Succession of Hyde,' decedent was survived by his second wife
and two children of his first marriage. In his will he left his second
spouse "the usufruct until her death of all property both separate and
community owned by me at my death." His children, as forced heirs,
claimed that this disposition should be reduced to a usufruct over the
disposable portion.' The widow argued that article 14991 of the Civil
Code compelled the forced heirs either to execute the disposition as
written, or to abandon the entire disposable portion to her in full
ownership. The widow prevailed. The Louisiana supreme court noted
that article 1752 of the Civil Code had once limited dispositions to
the second spouse but since 1916 had permitted the second spouse to
receive whatever the testator could leave to a "stranger."' The court
applied article 1499 as written, stating that "[s]uch is the price
which must be paid for frustration of the testator's will in this re-
gard."5 In the course of its opinion, the court reaffirmed that the
legitime can be satisfied only by a "fixed portion of the estate in
property" and "must be in full ownership," but saw no violation of
this principle so long as the election permitted by article 1499 was
preserved.
A literal reading of article 1499 indicates the election is available
only when the value of the usufruct exceeds the disposable portion,
suggesting the necessity to appraise the usufruct either by actuarial
means or otherwise. However, the court avoided the valuation issue
- its test is simply whether the usufruct impinges upon the forced
portion at all, regardless of its "value." ' By effectively reading out the
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1. 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974).
2. The legitime of the two children was one-fourth each, and the disposable por-
tion, one-half. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493.
3. "If the disposition made by donation inter vivos or mortis causa be of a usu-
fruct, or of an annuity, the value of which exceeds the disposable portion, the forced
heirs have the option either to execute the disposition or to abandon to the donee the
ownership of such portion of the estate as the donor had a right to dispose of." LA. Civ.
CODE art. 1499. (Emphasis added.)
4. "A man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having a
child or children by a former marriage, can give to his. wife . . . by last will and
testament . . . all of that portion of his estate . . . he . . . could legally give to a
stranger." LA. CrV. CODE art. 1752.
5. Succession of Hyde, 292 So. 2d 693, 697 (La. 1974).
6. "The Louisiana cases discussing this question have held that there is no need
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requirement that the value of the usufruct exceed the disposable
portion, the court left open the possibility that article 1499 will apply
in the case of only slight impingement. Suppose the second spouse,
age seventy-five, is left the usufruct on the entire estate which, by
actuarial valuation, is worth less than ten percent of the property
which it affects. According to Hyde, article 1499 would still apply
because valuation is not a factor-the relative value of the usufruct
and of the disposable portion are immaterial.
Suppose the Hyde disposition had been in trust with principal
to the forced heirs and income to the surviving spouse. The election
under article 1499 would seem to be available. If exercised, would the
trust continue as to all interests? Prior to a 1974 amendment, section
1844 of the Trust Code provided that the legitime in trust may be
burdened with an income interest or usufruct in favor of another "to
the same extent that a usufruct of the same property could be stipu-
lated in favor of the same person for a like period." The comments
following section 1844 discuss only the article 916 usufruct of the
surviving spouse or an equivalent income interest.' However, it would
seem reasonable to have extended section 1844 of the Trust Code to
the legitime in trust burdened with a usufruct (or equivalent income
interest) in favor of a stranger, subject to the election extended under
article 1499. Thus, had Mr. Hyde left his property in trust naming
his wife as income beneficiary for life and his children as principal
beneficiaries, in absence of an election under article 1499, the income
interest of the second spouse should constitute a permissible burden
on the legitime.5 Had the forced heirs elected to surrender the dispos-
to first value the usufruct. . . . This was the prevailing French view . . . and is the
prevailing French view. . . ." Id. The court relied upon its decision in Clarkson v.
Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858) and upon Professor Yiannopoulos' exposition of the
French Law. One could question the reliance upon decisions handed down before the
rise of modern actuarial science.
7. See LA. R.S. 9:1844 (Supp. 1964) comment (b); Id. comment (c): "An income
interest in a trust is an alternative to a usufruct. While the rights of an income
beneficiary may not be precisely the same as the rights of a usufructuary because the
nature of the property and consequent rules of administration and apportionment...
may differ, the vesting of an income interest in a trust as the substantial equivalent
of a usufruct complies with the requirements of this section, provided the trust instru-
ment creates no greater rights in the income beneficiary than the rights that would
exist under this Code if the trust instrument contained no provisions with respect to
administration, contribution of expenses, or apportionment of income." An extensive
comparison of the rights of usufructuaries and income beneficiaries is contained in
Hunter, Planning for the Surviving Spouse Under Forced Heirship, 1 COMMUNITY PROP-
E TY J. 195 (1974).
8. LA. R.S. 9:1844 (Supp. 1964) originally provided: "The legitime in trust may
be burdened with an income interest or with a usufruct in favor of a person other than
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able portion of the income from their forced portions, the trust would
probably have remained intact. Sections 1724 and 17371 of the Trust
Code together with its general legislative history suggest liberal con-
struction in favor of maintaining the trust and it seems reasonable
to assume that the settlor would not intend exercise of the election
to defeat the trust as to any interest. Thus, upon the forced heirs'
election, the second spouse would become principal beneficiary as to
the disposable portion and the forced heirs income beneficiaries as to
their legitime.
For federal estate tax purposes, the disposition in Hyde would
not qualify for marital deduction under article 2056 of the Internal
Revenue Code, since the usufruct is a "terminable interest." How-
ever, section 2056(d)(2) would seem to qualify the disposable portion
for the marital deduction if the election were made by the forced heirs
before the estate tax return was due and before accepting their inter-
ests in the succession.'" For this reason, forced heirs will want to
consider the effect of the marital deduction in deciding whether or not
to exercise the article 1499 election.
the forced heir to the same extent that a usufruct of the same property could be
stipulated in favor of the same person for a like period." (Emphasis added.) La. Acts
1974, No. 126 substitutes the words "surviving spouse" for "person other than the
forced heir." The new language would not have changed the result, had the Hyde
disposition been in trust, since Mrs. Hyde was a surviving spouse.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 1499 applies to any person who is named as usufructuary over
the forced portion, and permits him to retain the usufruct if the forced heirs so elect.
By contrast, LA. R.S. 9:1844 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 126,
would seem to limit those whose usufructs or income interests may burden the legitime
in trust, to the settlor's surviving spouse. In light of Hyde, perhaps the original lan-
guage of section 1844 should be restored.
9. LA. R.S. 9:1724 (Supp. 1964): "The provisions of this Code shall be accorded a
liberal construction in favor of freedom of disposition. . . . [N]either the Civil Code
nor any other law shall be invoked to defeat a disposition sanctioned expressly or
impliedly by this Code."
LA. R.S. 9:1737 (Supp. 1964): "A settlor may dispose of property in trust to the
same extent that he may dispose of that property free of trust and to any other extent
authorized by this Code. .. "
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d)(2): "If under this section an interest would,
in the absence of a disclaimer by any person other than the surviving spouse, be
considered as passing from the decedent to such person, and if a disclaimer of such
interest is made by such person and as a result of such disclaimer the surviving spouse
is entitled to receive such interest, then - (A) if the disclaimer of such interest is made
by such person before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return and if
such person does not accept such interest before making the disclaimer, such interest
shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as passing from the decedent to
the surviving spouse .. "
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PROHIBITED SUBSTITUTIONS
In Succession of Stewart," a bank co-trustee sought instructions
as to interpretation of several provisions of a testamentary trust cre-
ated in 1956, before the enactment of the Trust Code. The validity
of the trust itself was subsequently placed at issue. The trust was to
extend for the maximum term permitted by existing law. The trus-
tees were authorized to make "charitable bequests" of income at their
discretion, to make "loans or donations" at their discretion to "my
many nieces and nephews both of the whole and of the half blood as
well as their descendants," and were empowered to accumulate in-
come until the beneficiary, a named nephew, reached age sixty-five,
at which time the trust would terminate. The testator's stated inten-
tion was "to provide for my family, subject to the discretion of said
trustees, as I am confident the trustees can increase my said estate."
The bank trustee argued for an interpretation vesting income
and principal per stirpes in as many shares as there were nieces and
nephews of the decedent alive at his death and allocating each distri-
bution against the vested interest of each beneficiary. The trustee
further argued that substantial distribution of the trust estate was to
be accomplished by the time the named beneficiary reached the age
of sixty-five but in such manner as to preclude the total value of the
property from being diminished, if possible. The will was admittedly
ambiguous and considerable evidence of the testator's intention was
introduced, including the testimony of the attorney who drafted the
will and who largely supported the trustee's position. The supreme
court held the trust valid and the bank trustee's interpretation was
largely sustained. The maximum duration of the trust as provided by
section 1794(2) of the Trust Estates Act as to a trust created prior to
the 1962 amendment thereto was until the death of the last surviving
income beneficiary (here possibly foreshortened by the named benefi-
ciary reaching age sixty-five). The instruction as to "charitable be-
quests" by the trustees was viewed as merely precatory and without
binding effect. After a lengthy review of the jurisprudence, the court
concluded that none of the dispositions constituted prohibited substi-
tutions nor fidei commissa under article 1520 of the Civil Code as it
read at the testator's death in 1956,12 since each of the beneficiaries
11. 301 So. 2d 872 (La. 1974).
12. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1520: "Substitutions and fidei commissa are and remain
prohibited ... " La. Acts 1962, No. 45 changed the language to read: "Substitutions
are and remain prohibited, except as permitted by the laws relating to trust." Substi-
tutions were prohibited by La. Const. art. IV, §16 (1921). However, the 1974 Constitu-
tion does not contain such prohibition. See LA. CONST. art. XII, §5.
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was immediately vested with his interest at the creation of the trust.
Nor did the powers granted to the trustees allow them to choose
beneficiaries or to define their interests in violation of article 1573 of
the Civil Code which prohibits donations committed to the choice of
a third person."3 On this point, the court noted that section 2522 of
the Trust Code, as amended, provides that the Trust Code shall
govern "administrative and procedural matters" as to trusts created
prior to its enactment (unless otherwise stipulated in the trust instru-
ment); that the distributions to beneficiaries contemplated by the
Stewart trust (1956) were "purely administrative" and thus approved
and controlled by the subsequent enactment of section 2068 of the
Trust Code. Accordingly, although there may have been doubt
whether such distributions were authorized by the Trust Estates Act,
such authority was granted by section 2068 of the Trust Code. 4
Stewart is an important case in at least two respects. First, it
represents by far the most liberal construction of a trust instrument
yet handed down by the Louisiana supreme court. The trust was
created under the Trust Estates Act and could have easily been de-
clared invalid as containing numerous prohibited substitutions under
the negative approach taken by the court in Successions of Guillory,5
Meadors6 and Simms. 7 If Stewart represents the attitude of the ma-
jority of the supreme court towards trusts generally, then liberal con-
struction in favor of validity (as mandated by section 1724 of the
Trust Code) may be expected in subsequent decisions. Secondly, the
court has spoken favorably and for the first time about section 2252
of the Trust Code which applies its "administrative and procedural"
provisions to trusts created under prior law. 8
13. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1573: "The custom of willing by testament, by the interven-
tion of a commissary or attorney in fact is abolished. Thus the institution of an heir
and all other testamentary dispositions committed to the choice of a third person are
null, even should that choice have been limited to a certain number of persons desig-
nated by the testator."
14. LA. R.S. 9:2068 (Supp. 1964) provides generally for invasion of an interest in
principal or income under objective standards provided in the trust instrument and
for anticipatory distribution to sole beneficiaries.
15. Succession of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957).
16. Succession of Meadors, 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
17. Succession of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So. 2d 114 (1965).
18. LA. R.S. 9:2252 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 137 §1 pro-
vides in part: "Unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, trusts created prior
to the effective date of this Code shall be governed in all administrative and procedural
matters by the provisions of this Code and not by laws in effect at the time of creation
of such trusts, and trusts created prior to the adoption of any amendment to this Code
shall be governed in administrative and procedural matters by the provisions of the
amendment." (Emphasis supplied.) The comment following the 1968 amendment in-
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Ex PARTE INSTRUCTIONS TO TRUSTEES
In In re Gulf Oxygen Welders Supply Profit Sharing Plan and
Trust Agreement,'" trustees of a qualified profit sharing plan applied
to the district court "for instructions concerning the trust instrument,
interpretation of the instrument, or administration of the trust" pur-
suant to section 2233(B) of the Trust Code, with regard to the year
in which the plan had terminated."0 The district court viewed this as
a request for an advisory opinion and held section 2233(B) unconsti-
tutional. The supreme court in an opinion by Justice Tate, saw the
apparent intent of section 2233(B) as enabling the trustee to deal
efficiently with third persons pursuant to court instructions obtained
ex parte, but without prejudice to the rights of the settlor or a benefi-
ciary to hold the trustee liable for breach of his trust in that regard.
A trustee is not compelled to act at his peril in the administration
of the trust. He need not act first and discover later whether his
act was in breach of trust. He is entitled to instructions of the
court as a protection.
2
'
However, he is entitled to instructions only where there is reasonable
doubt as to his duties and powers.
The courts do not hold themselves out to act as lawyers for timid
trustees who seek court protection in every move they make or
who desire to save the trust the expenses of procuring the assis-
tance of a lawyer. Further, the trustee is not entitled to instruc-
tions on questions which have not yet arisen or may never arise.
2
dicates that no subsequent legislation shall affect any "vested rights." Apparently the
supreme court views the power to make anticipatory distributions to sole beneficiaries
as an "administrative power." There is obvious room for disagreement as to whether
an amendment authorizing the trustee to vary the time of enjoyment by a beneficiary
"affects his vested rights." Suppose R.S. 9:1963 were amended to give the trustee the
power to accumulate income even if the trust instrument is silent. Would such amend-
ment affect the "vested rights" of beneficiaries to a distribution of income every six
months, as would be the case under R.S. 9:1962 prior to such amendment?
19. 297 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974).
20. LA. R.S. 9:2233(B) (Supp. 1964): "A trustee may apply [to a proper court]
for instructions in ex parte proceedings. The order issued therein will protect a third
person relying on the order, but will not exonerate a trustee from liability to a settlor
or a beneficiary."
21. 297 So. 2d at 667, quoting 3 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 259 (3d ed. 1967).
22. 297 So. 2d at 667 n.6, quoting G. BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 96 (2d ed.
1960): " 'The court will not advise the trustee as to his powers where they are clearly
fixed by the trust instrument or by common or statute law, but only in cases of real
difficulty where there is an honest doubt after a careful reading of the instrument and
the procurement of legal advice from counsel. The courts do not hold themselves out
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The court seemed particularly concerned with the effect of such
instructions on the beneficiaries adversely affected who were not par-
ties to the trustee-instruction proceedings. Here the question was
whether a substantial forfeited interest of three resigned employees
in the trust had been properly allocated to the three new employees
who replaced them. The court seemed satisfied that the trustee could
be protected by such instructions but his acts pursuant thereto would
not be binding on beneficiaries without notice or opportunity to be
heard.
In dictum the court encouraged trial courts to seek help with
difficult trustee-instructions by pointing out that article 192 of the
Code of Civil Procedure permits a trial court on its own motion to call
upon "persons learned or skilled in a science, art, profession or call-
ing" as experts to assist in adjudication of any case in which their
special knowledge or skill may aid the court. It is not clear whether
this reference refers to expert legal opinion.
COMMUNITY INTEREST IN DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS
In Succession of Mendoza,23 the decedent had become a member
of the Seafarers' Union Welfare Plan prior to his marriage. All contri-
butions were made by the employer and were contingent upon mini-
mum employment under the union collective bargaining agreement.
The decedent had the right to designate a beneficiary but did not do
so. The issue was whether the death benefit payable to his estate in
absence of a designation of a different beneficiary was separate or
community property. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that
the death benefit was decedent's separate property since his right
thereto had been acquired prior to the marriage. The court cited
Succession of Rockvoan 24 where the non-testamentary designation of
a beneficiary of death benefits was upheld on the basis of the plan's
similarity to life insurance and distinguished Laffitte v. Laffitte,25
which held that an employee's fully vested interest in a qualified
profit sharing plan, all earned during the marriage, was community
property. The death benefit paid under a plan which antedated the
marriage constituted the separate property of the deceased. Since no
beneficiary was named, the benefit proceeds became probate assets.
Although concurring in the result, Judge Lemmon suggested that
to act as lawyers for timid trustees who seek court protection in every move they make
or who desire to save the trust the expense of procuring the assistance of a lawyer.'
23. 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
24. 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
25. 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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the decedent's right to name the recipient of the death benefits was
not "property" but rather a type of "power of appointment" not
susceptible to classification as separate or community; that classifi-
cation of a mere "power" to divert the proceeds from the probate
estate should not be a "property right."2 Instead, he suggested that
such benefits be allocated on the basis of the "source of funds" from
which they were derived. Applying this suggestion, he would allocate
that portion of the death benefit earned by work prior to the marriage
to the heirs of the separate estate and that part acquired by work
during the marriage to the heirs of the community estate. 7
Mendoza illustrates that Louisiana, like some other community
property states, is still wrestling with the incorporation of retirement
benefits into its traditional property system. Judge Lemmon was
concerned that Mendoza could have entered the welfare plan on the
day before his marriage and worked for thirty years thereafter and
that, upon his death, his wife would not be entitled to any of the
death benefits for which community labor and industry was almost
entirely responsible. Perhaps some comprehensive legislative solution
to employee deferred compensation benefits is in order.
26. Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673, 675 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (Lemmon,
J., concurring).
27. Judge Lemmon's reference to a "power of appointment" seems unfortunate
since such powers are not recognized by Louisiana law. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1573. How-
ever, his point seems well taken. As to death benefits generally, including life insur-
ance, community property states have adopted either an "inception of title" approach,
(characterizing the benefits as separate or community depending upon whether the
right was initially acquired before or during the marriage) or a "proportionate interest"
approach (characterizing the benefits according to the source of payment-i.e., insur-
ance premiums, employee fringe benefits, etc). Louisiana and Texas have adopted the
"inception of title" approach. In re Moseman's Estate, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886);
McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). But cf. Parsons v. U.S.,
308 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Tex. 1970). California and Washington give effect to the
"proportionate interest" approach which Judge Lemmon seems to favor. Forbes v.
Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953); In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379,
81 P.2d 283 (1938). See, e.g., Garcia, Retirement Benefits and the Right to Reimburse-
ment in a Community Property Divorce, 1 COMMUNITY PROPERTY J. 206 (1974), discuss-
ing an alternative to both approaches.
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